Thursday, November 8, 2007

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  • Read and locate the HOLDING or RULING by the court;
  • Read and locate the reasons the court gives for its RULING.

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BACKGROUND CASES & CODE: For Educational Purposes Only


SELECT STATUTORY CODE GOVERNING TRANSMUTATION AGREEMENTS
California Family Code (F.C.)
Sections 850-853


Married persons are free to form TRANSMUTATION AGREEMENTS during marriage:
F.C. 850:
".....married persons may by agreement or transfer, with or without consideration, do any of the following: (a) Transmute community property to separate property of either spouse.(b) Transmute separate property of either spouse to community property. (c) Transmute separate property of one spouse to separate property of the other spouse."

Transmutation agreements must be in writing.
Family Code 852 (a)
"A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected."
CASE LAW GUIDANCE : Interpreting F.C. 852 Writing Requirement
"[A] writing signed by the adversely affected spouse is not an 'express declaration' for the purposes of [Civil Code] section 5110.730 (a) [now section 852, subd. (a)] unless it contains language which expressly states that the characterization or ownership of the property is being changed." (Ibid.) [3] An "express declaration" does not require use of the terms "transmutation," "community property," "separate property," or a particular locution. (Estate of MacDonald, supra, 51 Cal.3d 262, 273.) For example, the language "I give to the account holder any interest I have in the funds deposited in this account," is sufficient to establish transmutation. (Ibid.) The express declaration must unambiguously indicate a change in character or ownership of property. (In re Marriage of Koester (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037, fn. 5.) A party does not "slip into a transmutation by accident."
Starkman (2005) 129 Cal App 4th 659 at p. 664
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP:
F.C. Section 721:
"In forming agreements between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other."
See also:
Haines (1995)33 CA 4th 277 at 293-294


RELATED BACKGROUND CASES:
McDonald (1990) 51 Cal 3d 262 @273
Starkman (2005) 129 Cal App 4th 659
Barneson (1999) 69 Cal App 4th 583

also:
Benson (2005)36 Cal 4th 1096 @1100
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NO CONSIDERATION IS REQUIRED IN A TRANSMUTATION AGREEMENT:
See:

FAMILY CODE 850
F.C. 3580 (Mutual consent of the parties is sufficient consideration.)

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SCRUTINY AND REVIEW OF MARITAL TRANSMUTATION AGREEMENTS:
THE COURT WILL APPLY SPECIAL SCRUTINY OF A MARITAL AGREEMENT WHEN ONE PARTY GAINS ADVANTAGE THROUGH THE AGREEMENT
When it can be shown that a transmutation agreement substantially benefits one spouse over another, a presumption of undue influence will be applied IF:

The outcome can be shown to be unfair or...
there was no consideration or...
there was inadequate consideration.

The spouse who gains advantage in a transmutation agreement must show the agreement was NOT the result of fraud, undue influence, menace or duress...

"The prerequisite elements for the statutory presumption under section 721 to apply are:
(1) there exists an interspousal transaction; and
(2) one spouse has obtained an advantage over the other. (
Haines (1995)33 CA 4th 277 at p. 301.) Generally, a spouse obtains an advantage if that spouse's position is improved, he or she obtains a favorable opportunity, or otherwise gains, benefits, or profits."
Mathews (2005) 133 CA 4th 624, at p. 629
--------------------
We discern no incongruity between Bonds and our conclusion that a spouse is presumed to have induced a transaction through undue influence only if he or she, in the words of Family Code section 721, has obtained an "unfair advantage" from the transaction.
Burkle (2006) 139 CA 4th 712 at p. 730-732
--------------------

BACKGROUND CASES & CODE: Undue Influence
Family Code: (F.C.)
F.C. Section 721

California Civil Code (C.C.):
CC 1550 (2)
CC 1565
CC 1567


Balcoff (2006) 141 CA 4th 1509 at 1523
Mathews (2005) 133 CA 4th 624
Delaney (2003) 111 CA 4th 991

Substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court's conclusion that Wife failed to bear her burden of establishing this. This evidence showed that Husband suffered cognitive impairments and as a consequence had entrusted all marital financial and legal matters to Wife, trusting and relying upon her judgment and management in this regard. Wife, on the other hand, had extensive experience in legal and financial matters, and had personal experience in her previous marriage with the transmutation of separate property to joint tenancy. Husband signed the documents conveying his unencumbered separate interest in the Property to himself and Wife jointly without questioning her instruction that it was necessary to do so. On this record, we have no basis for overturning the trial court's determination that Wife had failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence.
Delaney (2003) 111 CA 4th 991 at p. 1000

ALSO:
Haines (1995)33 CA 4th 296
Burkle (2006) 139 CA 4th 712



Also see:
Moore (1980) 28 Cal 3d 366
Marsden (1982) 130 Cal App 3d 426
Bono v. Clarke (2002) 103 Cal App. 4th 1409
Allen (2002) 96 Cal App 4th 962
Wolfe (2001) 91 Cal App 4th 962

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SCRUTINY AND REVIEW OF MARITAL TRANSMUTATION AGREEMENTS:
STANDARD CONTRACT LAW APPLICABLE:

With certain exceptions unique to family law, marital agreements are reviewed for their legal sufficiency and enforceability under contract law.

BACKGROUND CASES & CODE:
Estate of Wilson: 64 CA3d 786
'....absent a showing to the contrary, a party who has signed an agreement who holds capacity to read its contents will be bound...'

"As stated in Fowler v. Security-First Nat. Bank (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 37, 47 [303 P.2d 565]: [8] "A contract is indeed the result of objective manifestations of the parties. If those manifestations are sufficient [to establish a contract], the parties' subjective intentions or beliefs are wholly immaterial." (See 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Contracts, § 88, pp. 92-93.) Stated otherwise, when a person with a capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, in the absence of fraud or imposition he is bound by its contents, and he is estopped from saying that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or understanding. (Palmquist v. Mercer (1954) 43 Cal.2d 92, 98. "
Estate of Wilson: 64 CA3d 786 at p. 802.


See also:
F.C. 3580 (Mutual consent of the parties is sufficient consideration.)

Chadwick v Chadwick 1928

Contract Law: California Code
CC 1550
  • capacity
  • consent
  • lawful object
  • proper consideration

Contract Law: California Code
CC 1565
  • duress
  • menace
  • fraud
  • undue influence
  • mistake
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SCRUTINY AND REVIEW OF MARITAL TRANSMUTATION AGREEMENTS:

MARITAL AGREEMENT can not be punitive:

MARITAL AGREEMENT A can not "penalize" one party based on "faulty" behavior within marriage. This is because California is a "no fault" divorce state.



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SCRUTINY AND REVIEW OF MARITAL TRANSMUTATION AGREEMENTS:

For Educational Purposes Only:This Page Is Not Legal Advice

CASE HIGHLIGHTS: Starkman (2005) 129 Cal App 4th 659



FACTS OF STARKMAN:

Christine and Christopher married on October 6, 1990, and have two minor children....
Christopher is an heir to the United Parcel Service fortune, and he possesses substantial separate property assets. During the marriage, neither Christopher nor Christine were employed. Christopher supported the family with earnings from his separate property investments, primarily stock dividends.

In 1996, after the birth of his daughter, Christopher consulted with and employed attorney Warren Sinsheimer to prepare an estate plan. Among other instruments, Sinsheimer drafted a revocable declaration of trust, entitled "The Starkman Family Revocable Trust." Christopher and Christine executed the 32-page Trust and related estate planning instruments on January 28, 1997. [129 Cal.App.4th 662]

Relevant Trust and General Assignment Provisions

Paragraph 1.01 of the Trust states that the parties settled the Trust "to simplify their affairs as well as update their estate plan and assure its efficient operation." It also provides that the Trust's purposes are "to avoid probate and provide for the orderly administration of the Settlors' property in the event of the death or incapacity of either Settlor."

Paragraph 2.02 states that the Settlors intend "to transfer all their assets to the Trust Estate, to the greatest possible extent."

The heart of this appeal is Trust Paragraph 2.03. It provides that the "Settlors agree that any property transferred by either of them to the Trust . . . is the community property of both of them unless such property is identified as the separate property of either Settlor...

Christopher later executed various stock brokerage transfer forms to convey specific assets into the Trust. Each form designates the assets to be held by Christopher and Christine as trustees of the Trust. The forms do not describe the assets as either community property or separate property.

Following the parties' separation, Christopher exercised his right to revoke the Trust, pursuant to its terms. Christine asserted that the assets that Christopher conveyed to the Trust by the stock brokerage forms, however, had been transmuted into community property.Starkman (2005) 129 Cal App 4th 659 at p. 661-663]

TEST FOR PROPER WRITING AS REQUIRED BY F.C. 852 (a):
FROM THE FACE OF THE AGREEMENT, WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT?

Is the primary purpose of the agreement to transmute the entirety of one party's separate property asset into community property, or into the separate property of the other party?
GUIDANCE FROM STARKMAN CASE:

The Trust's purposes are "to avoid probate and provide for the orderly administration of the Settlors' property in the event of the death or incapacity of either Settlor." The Trust also appears to concern and perhaps allow for income tax basis benefits for community property upon the death of a Settlor. (Int. Rev. Code, § 1014.) Its purpose is not an agreement between Christine and Christopher to transmute the entirety of Christopher's substantial separate property assets into community property. Neither the sentence in Paragraph 2.03 upon which Christine relies, nor the conveyance to the Trust effected by the General Assignment (conveyance of "any asset, whether real, personal, or mixed . . . now own[ed] or . . . own[ed] in the future" to the Trust), unambiguously establish that Christopher was effecting a change of ownership in the entirety of his significant separate estate. (Estate of MacDonald, supra, 51 Cal.3d 262, 271-272 [statement of general rule regarding proof of transmutation].) For example, the parties might have stated in Paragraph 2.03 that any property transferred to the Trust by either of them "becomes" or "is changed into" the community property of the parties. The Trust purposes set forth in Paragraph 1.01 might have included as a purpose that Christopher was transmuting the entirety of his separate estate to community property.

Moreover, other Trust provisions appear to support our interpretation. Paragraph 3.02, for example, requires the trustee to pay the net income of separate property to the contributing Settlor for his maintenance and support. In the event the net income is insufficient for those purposes, the trustee is required to invade "the principal of said Settlor's separate property." A reasonable inference from this language is that separate property retains its separate property characterization.
Starkman (2005) 129 Cal App 4th 659 at p. 664-665

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMING WHETHER AGREEMENT MEETS F.C. 852 (a) WRITING REQUIREMENT:

We do not consider the letter sent by attorney Sinsheimer warning "that separate property be clearly identified as such" as bearing upon any asserted transmutation. It is inadmissible extrinsic evidence. (Estate of MacDonald, supra, 51 Cal.3d 262, 271-272.) Moreover, the warning letter was sent to the parties nearly one month following Christopher's execution of the General Assignment which had already transferred to the Trust all property that he owned or would own in the future.
Starkman (2005) 129 Cal App 4th 659 at p. 665

CASE BRIEF: Barneson (1999) 69 Cal App 4th 583

FACTS OF THE BARNESON CASE:
Barneson (1999) 69 Cal App 4th 583 at p. 585-586
"Robert L. Barneson (Barneson) and Evelyn Kaiser Barneson (Kaiser) were married on August 10, 1988. Barneson was 65 years old and Kaiser almost 36. At the time of the marriage, Barneson owned a multimillion-dollar stock portfolio. In November of 1989, Barneson suffered a stroke."

"Barneson signed a typed letter dated December 6, 1990, to Banker's Trust Company (Banker's Trust), referring to certain stock in Marina Oil Company, which stated as follows:
"This is written instruction as per our phone conversation. I Robert L. Barneson would like to combine these (4) four stock certificates into one, I would like to transfer these same stocks into the name of Evelyn J. Kaiser. Thank you." fn. 2 ......At some point, Barneson executed an "Irrevocable Stock or Bond Power," with his signature guaranteed by an officer of Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. This form document begins with the phrase "For value received, the undersigned does (do) hereby sell, assign, and transfer unto," after which the name Evelyn Kaiser was written."

ISSUE PRESENTED IN THE CASE:

"The question in the present case is whether ..... Barneson's actions in transferring the Marina Oil stock and the securities in his Schwab account into Kaiser's name effectively transmuted the securities from his separate property into her separate property. The issue is governed by Family Code section 852, subdivision (a), which provides: "A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected."
HOLDING: Mr. Barneson did NOT transmute the stock to his then wife, as her separate property.

FACE OF THE AGREEMENT TEST:
EVIDENTIARY FACTORS THAT MAY REBUT PRESUMED UNDUE INFLUENCE
Party seeking to overcome the presumption must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transmutation agreement was:
  1. Freely and voluntarily made;
  2. With full knowledge of the facts,
  3. With a complete understanding of the effect of the transmutation.

TEST FOR PROPER WRITING AS REQUIRED BY F.C. 852 (a), and that establishes the transferring party had a complete understanding of the effect of the transmutation:
From the face of the MARITAL AGREEMENT, is it possible to tell whether the transmuting party was "aware that the legal effect of his or her signature might be to alter the character or ownership of her interest in the property?
"MacDonald held the wife's signature on these forms was not sufficient to support a finding of transmutation: The consent paragraphs contained no language characterizing the property; it was not possible to tell from the face of the documents whether the wife was "aware that the legal effect of her signature might be to alter the character or ownership of her interest in the pension funds"; and there was no language "expressly stating that [the wife] was effecting a change in the character or ownership of her interest." (51 Cal.3d at pp. 272-273.) The MacDonald court noted that the "express declaration" requirement did not mean a writing must use any particular term (such as "transmutation," "community property" or "separate property") and suggested the document in that case would have been sufficient if it had included the additional provision " 'I give to the account holder any interest I have in the funds deposited in this account.' "
Barneson (1999) 69 Cal App 4th 583 at p. 589.
EXPLICIT STATEMENT DIRECTING TRANSFER OF TITLE IS NOT FINAL AND DISPOSITIVE EVIDENCE OF INTENT TO CHANGE CHARACTER OF THE PROPERTY:
As we have discussed, the direction to "transfer" an asset into a different name does not necessarily connote an intention to change beneficial ownership.
Barneson (1999) 69 Cal App 4th 583 at p. 589.
TEST FOR PROPER WRITING AS REQUIRED BY F.C. 852 (a), and that establishes the transferring party had a complete understanding of the effect of the transmutation:
MACDONALD TEST:
The MacDonald test requires a clear demonstration of a change in ownership or characterization of the property at issue. A statement placing the property as into her name "...as her sole and separate property..." is sufficient to meet the McDonald test.

We recognize that the facts before us differ from those in MacDonald and present a closer case. As in MacDonald, however, Barneson's written directions to transfer stock "contain no language which characterizes the property assertedly being transmuted" and "[i]t is not possible to tell from the face of [the documents] whether decedent was aware that the legal effect of [his] signature might be to alter the character or ownership of [his] interest in the [property]." The Supreme Court in MacDonald made very clear that it was attempting to effectuate legislative intent by creating a bright-line test for evaluation of purported transmutations. The MacDonald test is not difficult to meet: It requires only a clear demonstration of a change in ownership or characterization of the property at issue. Here, if Barneson had truly intended a transmutation, he could have added to his directions to transfer stock a sentence indicating he was giving his interest in the stocks to Kaiser; he could even have directed them transferred into her name "as her sole and separate property." In the absence of such language, the documents are not sufficient to demonstrate a transmutation under section 852, subdivision (a).
Barneson (1999) 69 Cal App 4th 583 at 594

CASE HIGHLIGHTS: Burkle (2006) 139 CA 4th 712

The meaning of "advantage" in a marital transaction.

[2] It is settled that the predicate for applying a presumption of undue influence in an interspousal transaction is that one spouse has obtained an advantage over the other in the transaction. (Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 297; see Bonds, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 27.) The presumption of undue influence is regularly applied in marital transactions in which one spouse has deeded property to the other, as in Haines. In such cases, it is evident one spouse has obtained an advantage -- the deeded property -- from the other. In other more comprehensive marital transactions involving the division of community assets, the nature of the "advantage" required to raise a presumption of undue influence has not been much discussed in the cases. However, the language of Family Code section 721 is clear, prohibiting either spouse from taking "any unfair advantage of the other." (Fam. Code, § 721, subd. (b).) Section 721, together with our analysis of the case authorities, leads us to conclude that the "advantage" which raises a presumption of undue influence in a marital transaction involving a contractual exchange between spouses must necessarily be an unfair advantage.

As long ago as 1894, the Supreme Court stated that:

"The moment it appears . . . that 'an unfair advantage' has been obtained, the presumption that it was procured by undue influence arises out of the existence of the confidential relation of husband and wife . . . ." (Dimond v. Sanderson (1894) 103 Cal. 97, 102 (Dimond).)

Almost a century later, the principle of unfair advantage was codified by the predecessor to Family Code section 721 (former Civil Code section 5103), which expressly defines the fiduciary duties of spouses in transactions with each other. The existence of unfair advantage -- or lack of consideration -- as a predicate to the presumption of undue influence in a marital transaction has been frequently suggested in precedents over the years, both before and after the enactment of section 721 and its predecessor. Thus:

In Estate of Cover (1922) 188 Cal. 133, 144 (Cover), the Supreme Court said that the "mere existence of the marriage relation alone will not, in and of itself, suffice to initiate and support the presumption of undue influence where the transaction between husband and wife is prima facie, or, from all of the circumstances thereof, shown to be fair and free from any material advantage to the husband from and over the wife." [139 Cal.App.4th 731]

In In re Marriage of Baltins (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 66, 88, the court observed: "The marriage relationship alone will not support a presumption of undue influence by one spouse over the other where the transaction between them is shown to be fair."

In Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 277, the court expressly stated that the presumption of undue influence arises under Family Code section 721 "[w]here one spouse has taken advantage of another" in the transaction. (Id. at p. 301.) The word "advantage," in this context, plainly does not mean merely that a gain or benefit has been obtained. Taking "advantage of another" necessarily connotes an unfair advantage, not merely a gain or benefit obtained in a mutual exchange.

In re Marriage of Delaney (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 991, 996 (Delaney) stated that "when any interspousal transaction advantages one spouse to the disadvantage of the other, the presumption arises that such transaction was the result of undue influence." Again, a mere benefit is not enough; the advantage must operate "to the disadvantage" of the other spouse.

In In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, the Supreme Court, while it did not discuss the presumption issue, likewise emphasized the necessity for a showing of unfairness: "To support a finding of undue influence, '[the] evidence, in addition to a showing of marriage relationship, must also show such unfairness of the transaction as will tend to establish that the wrongful spouse made use of the confidence reposed for the purpose of gaining an unreasonable advantage over the mate.'" (Id. at pp. 863-864, quoting Snyder v. Snyder (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 489, 492.)

Finally, numerous cases apply the presumption of undue influence when the marital transaction is one in which one spouse deeds his or her interest in community property to the other spouse, for no consideration or for clearly inadequate consideration. (E.g., Weil v. Weil (1951) 37 Cal.2d 770, 787-789 [husband who secures a property advantage from his wife has the burden to show the absence of undue influence; wife's deed to husband was voluntary where the wife was aware that the spouses' interests were in conflict and she had ample opportunity to obtain independent advice].) Cases such as Weil and Haines, involving property transfers without consideration, necessarily raise a presumption of undue influence, because one spouse obtains a benefit at the expense of the other, who receives nothing in return. The advantage obtained in these cases, too, may be reasonably characterized as a species of unfair advantage. [139 Cal.App.4th 732]

In short, both Family Code section 721 and case precedents support the conclusion that in a contractual exchange between spouses, a presumption of undue influence arises only if one of the spouses has obtained an unfair advantage over the other. The Supreme Court's language in Bonds -- that the advantaged spouse bears the burden of demonstrating that the agreement was not obtained through undue influence -- is in no way inconsistent with this conclusion. Bonds involved a premarital agreement and, in its discussion contrasting premarital agreements with marital settlement agreements, expressly posits a transaction which "advantages one spouse" (Bonds, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 28) -- not a transaction in which both spouses obtain advantages. Bonds had no occasion to elucidate the meaning of "advantage" in a contractual exchange between spouses where both spouses obtain different advantages from the agreement. We discern no incongruity between Bonds and our conclusion that a spouse is presumed to have induced a transaction through undue influence only if he or she, in the words of Family Code section 721, has obtained an "unfair advantage" from the transaction.

Burkle (2006) 139 CA 4th 712 at p. 730-732

CASE BRIEF: Balcoff (2006) 141 CA 4th 1509

SCRUTINY AND REVIEW OF MARITAL TRANSMUTATION AGREEMENTS:
UNDUE INFLUENCE: DURESS & UNDUE INFLUENCE

BACKGROUND CASE BRIEF
Balcoff (2006) 141 CA 4th 1509

The court of appeals, found that duress does not require proof of illegal acts but rather "includes whatever destroys one's free agency" and may be proven by "threats, importunity or any species of mental coercion..."

FACTS:

"In this case, Kathleen secured an advantage through the October 1999 writing, because she obtained a 20 percent interest in Ralph's separate property corporation as well has his share of the marital residence. (See In re Marriage of Delaney, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 995-997.) Therefore, the statutory presumption arose that she exercised undue influence against Ralph in obtaining his signature on the October 1999 writing, and that the writing should be set aside. (In re Marriage of Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 628-629; In re Marriage of Delaney, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 996-997.)"

[4] "The burden of rebutting the presumption of undue influence [was] on [Kathleen, as] the spouse who acquired an advantage or benefit from the transaction. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 630.) [141 Cal.App.4th 1520] "Consequently, it was [her] burden to establish [Ralph's] signing of the [October 1999 writing] was freely and voluntarily made, with full knowledge of all the facts, and with a complete understanding of its effect of making the [shares of stock and the marital residence] separate property. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) It was her burden to rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at p. 631.)

HOLDING:

Substantial evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that Kathleen did not rebut the presumption (
of undue influence) by a preponderance of the evidence.

RATIONALE FOR HOLDING: Undue Influence
In its statement of decision, the trial court held that "[Kathleen] exerted undue influence on [Ralph] in order to obtain the [October 1999] writing." Ralph asserts that this holding was correct. We agree.
....

The trial court found that "[t]he writing was a transaction between the parties, which arose out of their confidential relationship as spouses and was not made at arms length." It also found that "[Kathleen] gained an advantage over [Ralph] by virtue of the writing, in that it transferred assets to her which she did not previously own." In addition, the court stated, in its statement of decision: "4. [Kathleen] threatened [Ralph] with divorce and the obstruction of his relationship with their children if he did not prepare the writing. [¶] 5. [Kathleen] harangued and berated [Ralph] during the marriage in an effort to force him to modify the parties' prenuptial agreement to provide more security for [her]. The berating included several incidents where [Kathleen] physically struck [Ralph]. [¶] [Kathleen] screamed at [Ralph] for at least 45 minutes immediately preceding his writing the October 1999 writing, which screaming included threats of divorce and obstructing [Ralph's] relationship with the minor children if he did not make the writing. [Ralph] reasonably believed [Kathleen's] threats, and that she intended to follow through with her threats. These threats alone or coupled with his state of mind resulting from the many prior episodes of verbal and physical abuse, constituted duress which resulted in his making the writing. [¶] Further, [Kathleen] subjected [Ralph] to a continuous barrage of yelling and threats of divorce and obstructing [Ralph's] relationship with the minor children in the parties' hotel room from the time he started the writing until he was initially finished. Thereafter, [Kathleen's] barrage of threats continued until [Ralph] wrote an additional penalty clause, which he did at her insistence. [¶] Coupled with the prior history of [Kathleen's] haranguing and berating [Ralph] concerning the prenuptial agreement, the threats to take his children away from him immediately before he made the writing, unless he made the writing, constituted duress."

[5] The threats also constituted undue influence, inasmuch as his execution of the document was not "freely and voluntarily made." (In re Marriage of Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 630; see also In re Marriage of Baltins (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 66, 83 [consent is not [141 Cal.App.4th 1521] "free" when obtained through duress, menace, or undue influence].) He executed the document as a reaction to Kathleen's continued yelling and screaming and out of fear that she would otherwise block him from having a continued relationship with his children.

CASE BRIEF: Mathews (2005) 133 CA 4th 624

GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY COURT CASES
CASE ANALYSIS
Mathews (2005) 133 CA 4th 624
SCRUTINY AND REVIEW OF MARITAL TRANSMUTATION AGREEMENTS:
When it can be shown that a transmutation agreement substantially benefits one spouse over another, a presumption of undue influence will be applied when the court scrutinizes and reviews the transmutation agreement.
FACTS of In Re Mathews:
Yatsuko Mathews (Wife) appeals a judgment in favor of Todd Mathews (Husband) in a marriage dissolution proceeding awarding Husband their residence as his separate property. This action arose when the parties could not agree on the characterization of the residence, which Wife had quitclaimed to Husband.

In 2002 the couple purchased the residence at issue for $156,655 in El Cajon, California. To obtain a more favorable interest rate on a mortgage Wife quitclaimed her interest in the residence to Husband, and the residence was acquired in his name alone. The quitclaim deed was validly executed and recorded. Wife acknowledged the residence was acquired solely in Husband's name but believed her name would be added to the title at a later date. Throughout the marriage, Wife and Husband both believed the residence was community property and after the separation discovered title to the residence was in his name alone....substantial evidence supports the court's findings that no undue influence existed and the residence is Husband's separate property.

HOLDING: Court found in favor of husband, and that husband overcame presumption of undue influence

RATIONALE FOR HOLDING:
Husband's most difficult factor in overcoming the presumption of undue influence was showing Wife had a complete understanding of the effect [133 Cal.App.4th 632] of the quitclaim deed. Wife contends that language barriers limited her comprehension of the purchase of the residence. However, the record shows Wife was above average in her English skills and competent to complete a college certification course taught in English. She spoke English from the time she met Husband and eventually worked as a translator, suggesting a more than adequate command of the English language. Further, Husband entrusted almost all financial matters to wife, relying on her judgment and management. Wife had separate investment accounts and made her own investment decisions with those accounts. She controlled both her income and Husband's, and paid all of the household bills. Wife acknowledged her bad credit rating prevented her and Husband from receiving a lower interest rate if they both acquired title to the residence, and made a conscious decision to sign the quitclaim deed. Wife further admitted to knowing her name was not on the title and assumed it would be added later. On this record, there is no basis for overturning the trial court's decision that the quitclaim deed was valid and executed freely and voluntarily in good faith. Husband rebutted the presumption of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence.
EVIDENTIARY STANDARD REQUIRED TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE:
A preponderance of the evidence is required to overcome the presumption of undue influence.
Although some authority requires clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption (Bank of America v. Crawford (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 697, 701), the weight of authority concludes the burden of rebutting the presumption of undue influence is by a preponderance of the evidence. (See Estate of Stephens (2002) 28 Cal.4th 665, 677; Estate of Gelonese (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 854, 863.) Moreover, Evidence Code section 115 defines burden of proof and states, "Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence." Because section 721does not specify a greater burden, Husband may overcome the presumption of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Mathews (2005) 133 CA 4th 624, at p. 631
FURTHER GUIDANCE FROM In Re Mathews CASE:
EVIDENTIARY FACTORS THAT MAY REBUT PRESUMED UNDUE INFLUENCE:
Party seeking to overcome the presumption must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transmutation agreement was:
  1. Freely and voluntarily made;
  2. With full knowledge of the facts,
  3. With a complete understanding of the effect of the transmutation.
Haines and Family Code section 721 do not specifically delineate an evidentiary standard for overcoming the presumption of undue influence; however, Haines does specify several factors that rebut the presumption of undue influence. These factors include evidence the quitclaim deed was freely and voluntarily made, with a full knowledge of all the facts and with a complete understanding of the effect of the quitclaim deed. (Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 296.) Mathews (2005) 133 CA 4th 624, at p. 630.